Eea Agreement Direct Effect

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[26] In Liechtenstein, the problem is different because of its monistic approach to international commitments. However, the Supreme Court of Liechtenstein expressly confirmed the direct effect of the agreement, Thomas Bruha said in M lle-Graff and Selvig (note) 1999. 62.Although some policy areas are excluded from the EEA agreement, Dr Sverdrup told us that Norway and other EEA states are in practice “subject to three quarters of all EU legislation”. In these areas, he added that Norway should have the same rules as an EU member state.82 Regarding the application of state aid rules, he said: “The rules are no more lax in Norway than in the EU. They`re exactly the same. 83 In its sveinbj rnsdottir decision, the Supreme Court of Iceland states stated that it was natural that the act of implementing the main part of the EEA agreement should be interpreted in such a way that a person would be entitled to Iceland`s legislation being brought into compliance with the EEA rules. To the extent that this is not the case, it follows from the act and the fundamental principles of the EEA agreement that the state assumes responsibility under Icelandic law. [19] The Tribunal clearly considers the main part of the agreement that has been implemented as Icelandic national law and includes the fundamental principles of the agreement. It also announces its willingness to comply with the opinions of the EFTA Court of Justice, unless there are special circumstances requiring an exemption from it. It may also be true that interpretations of national law, which the Court considers inherent or natural, are not very broad or controversial. It is not highly questionable that a rule of application of Protocol 35, according to which the EEA rules implemented in the context of a conflict between the transposed provisions of the EEA and other legislative provisions, predominate in the context of the transposition of EEA legislation, will include a rule that favours the transposition of EEA legislation over national rules.

But is this also the case in national statutes, which are newer than the EEA rule implemented? Protocol 35 clearly covers this situation, although it is clear that the national provision is intended as a departure from the EEA rule implemented. But does Protocol 35 require a national provision prohibiting the expiry of EEA rules? And if so, is it inherent in a national provision for the application of Protocol 35? It is clearly doubtful that the EFTA Court of Justice will rule on the provisions of national law. Sveinbj rnsdottir`s interpretation is perhaps even more controversial. The Court here includes the national responsibility for the transposition of the state, a rule that is not expressly included in the agreement. This is a form of implementation without implementation. This is currently limited to liability liability, as this principle must be seen as an integral part of the EEA agreement as such. But what about other principles of Community law, such as the duty of loyalty of national courts, principles of proportionality and protection of legitimate trust, protection of human rights, etc.? What if these were the building blocks that should be considered implemented as a result of the implementation of the agreement itself? [15] It is tempting to wonder to what extent this differs from the principle of the direct effect of the treaty provisions, as established by Community law. If the priority that accompanies the implementation of Protocol 35 covers the broader scope proposed to Sveinbj rnsdottir, a hierarchy of standards will be incorporated into the EEA agreement.

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