The payment analysis shows that PNG is doing better if it is partially compliant than with full compliance with the status quo (Table 2). In particular, PNG`s estimated revenue from partial compliance access fees is approximately $76 million, compared to $93 million for full compliance (see Table 2, Columns C and B). However, PNG receives approximately $68 million in partial compliance with third-party transfers, so the current payment from PNG under the status quo is approximately $144 million. Our results indicate that Kiribati is doing better if the VDS is fully respected than partially. Based on available data, Kiribati currently earns about $50 million, with partial compliance, compared to $67 million if VDS rules are strictly enforced (Table 2). Like PNG, Kiribati bears the largest loss of revenue for deep-sea fishing, as they account for their share of efforts on the high seas. However, an additional $16 million in third-party transfers increases the total partial compliance distribution to $66 million. These calculations show that the lack of $1 million in partial compliance with Kiribati should prompt support full VDS compliance. Based on this agreement, the same states achieved sales of $500 million in 2019. Our analysis shows the challenges of full VDS compliance in ANP countries in the presence of parasitism incentives.
We provide information on how to maintain the stability of the ANP as a “new fishing subregs” next to the larger WCPFC. Our empirical application supports the idea that players are better off in the long term by working fully together (Kronbak and Lindroos 2006; Bailey et al. 2013), but full cooperation only seems beneficial if there are no incentives for parasitists arising from (already) existing access agreements. Therefore, in the short term, incomplete compliance appears to be the most rational option. The results also indicate that full participation is not always stable (Wangler et al. 2013). In support of the finus and the mouse (2008), we show that coalition stability can be improved if partial compliance with the VDS is tolerated by coalition members. This is what we call “pragmatic tolerance.” We note that a stable coalition will be maintained as long as members` allowances improve slightly beyond distribution outside of parasitism distributions. He pointed out that the trade in fishing days between ANP members and the pooling of days to allow fishing vessels access to several areas, which increases the selling value of the fishing day, all work.
In order to continue to understand the role of third-party transfers in stabilizing the Nauru agreement with partial respect, we are now focusing on PNG and Kiribati. Both countries are essential to the implementation of the VDS, as they account for the largest share of the fishing effort and catches within the ANPs. As dominant players, they also play the most important role for the overall stability of the VDS and, therefore, for the success of the new fisheries regionalism. They are also particularly interesting for our analysis, as kiribati and PNG both have, based on 2014 data, the highest number of non-fishing days with 4593 and 1074 days respectively (see Table 1). In addition, both countries are firmly involved in existing access and trade agreements, particularly with the European Union. We now give a more detailed overview of the influence of the two countries on the stability of the VDS. See additional table 2 for transfers of third-party calculations and supplementary tables 2.1 to 2.4 for raw and secondary data used for calculations.